1. Introduction
The occurrence of catastrophic maritime disasters has persistently triggered intense social discourse regarding the deficit in professionalism within the Korea Coast Guard (KCG), the overarching agency responsible for maritime safety management. Critics argue that the series of organizational restructurings and post-disaster countermeasures implemented immediately following these incidents have skewed toward short-term remedies, thereby failing to function as fundamental solutions for structural reform and recurrence prevention. Furthermore, as geopolitical competition surrounding maritime territories has recently diversified, the significance of mandatory state functions executed by the KCG—such as sovereign maritime defense, safety management, policing, and marine pollution response—is intensifying (Go, 2024: 513-517). Amid these increasingly sophisticated shifts in the maritime environment, acquiring maritime expertise operates as a critical imperative directly linked to organizational survival, which must ultimately be realized through the systematic development of key personnel and specialized career management.
Since its inception in 1953, the KCG has achieved remarkable external growth in terms of human resources and advanced equipment; however, evaluations of its qualitative job proficiency remain severely constrained. Despite institutional attempts to introduce high-caliber human resources through diversified recruitment channels, the recurring vacuum in field response capabilities is attributed to weakened control over mid-to-long-term human resource planning and the non-institutionalization of Strategic Human Resource Management (SHRM) frameworks (Yun, 2021: 3). Specifically, the constraints within the short-term cultivation system for newly commissioned officers, coupled with the structural fragmentation of career tracks induced by short-cycle rotation practices post-appointment, function as critical barriers inhibiting the accumulation of practical job proficiency. Previous literature similarly diagnoses that as the KCG skewed heavily toward an administrative-centric organizational structure, field-centered career path construction and management policies for core personnel failed to operate substantively (Shin et al., 2017: 1-4).
Previous studies regarding the expertise of the Korea Coast Guard (KCG) have mainly focused on single maritime accident case analyses or fragmentary improvements in training systems. However, maritime expertise cannot be acquired solely through short-term training; rather, it is systematically developed within the structural interconnectedness of overall personnel management and career paths—encompassing recruitment, education, assignment, and promotion. Nevertheless, academic attempts to organically integrate the career management system of the KCG with maritime expertise from the perspectives of Strategic Human Resource Management (SHRM) and organizational theory remain remarkably limited.
To address these limitations in the literature (Research Gap), this study establishes an integrated analytical framework combining SHRM theory and crisis management theory. The objective is to examine how the recruitment and career path structures for key officers influence field operational responsiveness, thereby deriving practical and academic implications.
To achieve this, this study conducts major accident case analyses alongside comparative analyses with domestic and international counterpart agencies, including the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN), the United States Coast Guard (USCG), and the Japan Coast Guard (JCG). The analytical scope of "key officers and leadership" examined in this study encompasses personnel ranging from entry-level commissioned officers (e.g., officer candidates, Police University graduates, higher civil service appointees, and legal professionals) to senior commanders at field stations, regional headquarters, and the main headquarters (e.g., Senior Superintendents, Senior Superintendent Generals, and higher ranks). In particular, this study focuses its discussion on officer candidates—who represent the highest proportion among the leadership—analyzing the link between post-entry career management stages and field command capabilities.
Ultimately, by synthesizing practical job analysis with crisis management and collaborative governance theories, this study proposes an integrated virtuous mechanism of "Institutionalization–Operationalization–Securing Reliability" for the future direction of the KCG, thereby seeking to contribute to the establishment of a sustainable maritime safety system.
2. Theoretical Background and Literature Review
2.1 The Concept and Sub-components of Maritime Expertise
In general, professionalism is defined as a multidimensional set of competencies and attitudes through which individuals acquire systematic knowledge and skills within a specific occupational domain and produce high-performance outcomes based on them. In the context of policing and public administration, professionalism serves as a critical variable determining the quality of public services and functions as the foundational basis for securing external legitimacy and institutional trust beyond mere law enforcement (Klockars, 1985; Bayley, 1994).
The concept of 'maritime expertise' in the Korea Coast Guard (KCG) combines this general professionalism with the spatial and environmental domain specificity of the maritime environment. It encompasses not only technical proficiency in vessel operations (navigation, engineering, and communications) and international maritime regulations, but also complex and specialized operational capabilities required to diagnose and resolve dynamic maritime crises in real time.
The sub-components and assessment criteria of maritime expertise are presented in Table 1.
2.2 Job Specificity and Imperatives from a Strategic Human Resource Management (SHRM) Perspective
The operational environment of the KCG is characterized by severe risk and high uncertainty due to the omnipresence of unpredictable environmental variables, including waves, strong winds, and tidal currents. Consequently, the experiential knowledge required to execute multifunctional missions—such as maritime security, search and rescue (SAR), and marine pollution response—possesses asset-specific traits that cannot be accumulated over a short-term horizon (Shin et al., 2017: 1-4). Reflecting these operational specificities, Article 19 of the Framework Act on the Korea Coast Guard explicitly mandates the cultivation of specialized personnel and the advancement of education and training systems, thereby reinforcing the institutional legitimacy of securing maritime expertise.
From a Strategic Human Resource Management (SHRM) perspective, these complex job characteristics demand a sophisticated degree of 'Person-Job Fit' between individual competencies and actual assignments. In particular, contemporary global trends—such as shifts in the maritime world order and the imperative to establish transnational maritime disaster response architectures—powerfully dictate the acquisition of an expanded form of maritime expertise. This form of expertise must transcend traditional, fragmented law enforcement paradigms to simultaneously encompass both technical proficiency and collaborative governance capabilities.
2.3 Case Studies on Enhancing Maritime Expertise in Domestic and International Similar Organizations
2.3.1 The Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN): Track-Centered Elite Development and Long-Term Educational Systems
To mitigate the high uncertainty of the maritime operational environment, the ROKN implements long-term intensive training programs and an optimized career path development system from the initial stages of commissioning.
First, the ROKN secures long-term maritime leadership by diversifying its elite officer cultivation infrastructure. The navy produces approximately 695 officers annually through multiple commissioning pathways, including the Republic of Korea Naval Academy, Officer Candidate School (OCS), and the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC). In particular, the Naval Academy, which serves as the core pillar, rigorously selects around 170 candidates each year to undergo an advanced four-year intensive curriculum, thereby institutionally guaranteeing the organization’s foundational proficiency (ROKN, 2026).
Second, the ROKN operates an interdisciplinary and integrated maritime education curriculum. Beyond military strategy and operational theories, the naval training framework encompasses technical and engineering-driven maritime specialties directly linked to vessel operations, such as Introduction to Navigation, Ship Maneuvering, Navigational Instruments, Introduction to Naval Architecture, and Marine Propulsion Systems. By combining the institutional specificity of the Naval Academy with the universal standards of higher education, this curriculum provides a solid human resource foundation capable of actively responding to dynamic maritime crises (Yun, 2024: 305).
Third, the ROKN enforces a job specialization-oriented personnel management framework based on functional tracks. Naval officers are categorized into granular functional tracks—such as surface warfare (navigation) or engineering—immediately upon commissioning. Regarding career administration, the navy strictly adheres to sea-shore rotation principles while confining career paths within an officer’s designated functional domain. This structural approach systematically prevents the disconnection of expertise often caused by generalized rotation systems and encourages the cumulative enrichment of job proficiency.
Fourth, the ROKN pursues global standardization through simulation-based advanced training systems. It maximizes field adaptability by building high-fidelity simulation-based training (SBT) networks that replicate actual vessel environments (Naval Education and Training Command, 2026). Furthermore, through regular combined maritime exercises with foreign forces, such as the U.S. Navy, the ROKN continuously maintains and advances its combined operational capabilities in alignment with global standards.
2.3.2 The United States Coast Guard (USCG): A Small Elite Force and Field-Centric Education
The USCG operates as a multifunctional organization that simultaneously embodies the attributes of both a military entity and a law enforcement agency. Considering the high-risk nature of maritime missions, it deploys a long-term, systematic Human Resource Development (HRD) framework (Yun, 2024: 306-307).
First, the USCG conducts high-intensity intensive training through its specialized academy setup. The United States Coast Guard Academy (CGA) selects a small, elite cohort (approximately 200 cadets annually) through a rigorous screening process and provides a four-year interdisciplinary curriculum that organically integrates engineering, maritime law, and nautical science. All cadets are mandated to complete vessel operation modules and practical cruise training. Notably, the academy maintains an intimate instructor-to-student ratio of approximately 3:1, maximizing practical adaptability through close-contact, field-oriented education.
Second, the USCG balances competencies based on practical experience and supplements specialized expertise via the Direct Commission Officer (DCO) program. Graduates of the academy are institutionally mandated to undergo initial shipboard assignments upon commissioning. Based on this practical maritime experience, they later balance administrative duties within shore-based departments, thereby ensuring the concurrent acquisition of field responsiveness and managerial capability. Furthermore, in fields requiring a high degree of specialization—such as aviation, legal affairs, intelligence, and engineering—the USCG actively utilizes the DCO pathway to continuously recruit external seasoned professionals, thereby reinforcing the organization's specialized functional capabilities.
Third, the USCG operates differentiated professional training centers for lifecycle-tailored job education. The organization continuously elevates the expertise of its personnel throughout their career stages by utilizing four specialized training infrastructures: the Aviation Training Center (aviation proficiency), Training Center Petaluma (non-commissioned officer competency development and advanced training), and Training Center Yorktown (advanced job education).
Fourth, the USCG implements substantive governance based on public-private partnerships. Through organic linkages with civilian assets, such as the United States Coast Guard Auxiliary, the agency vitalizes a collaborative governance framework that maximizes operational efficiency in maritime safety support, public education, and search and rescue (SAR) missions beyond mere law enforcement functions (USCG, 2026).
2.3.3 The Japan Coast Guard (JCG): Balance of Technology and Administration, and Rotational Expertise
Although the JCG was originally modeled after the USCG, it has secured its maritime expertise through a distinctive, integrated training curriculum and a systematic rotation system tailored to the Japanese maritime environment (Kang, 2019: 22-26; Yun, 2024: 306).
First, the JCG maintains a long-term academic structure centered on the Japan Coast Guard Academy. The academy operates an extensive four-and-a-half-year professional training framework (producing approximately 60 officers annually), which mandates a six-month international maritime affairs program in addition to the four-year regular undergraduate course. The interdisciplinary curriculum integrates technical expertise (navigation, marine engineering, and telecommunications) with legal and administrative knowledge (maritime laws and regulations, crisis management theories, etc.), thereby cultivating convergent talents equipped with balanced administrative and technical competencies.
Second, the JCG designs career paths through the strategic rotation of sea and shore assignments. Academy graduates are institutionally required to undergo initial shipboard assignments on patrol vessels upon commissioning to acquire practical operational capabilities, after which they are deployed to shore-based planning and administrative departments. This phased assignment management functions as an institutional mechanism to nurture administrators who concurrently possess field responsiveness and macro-level administrative vision.
Third, the JCG standardizes simulation-based education and establishes governance linkages. To minimize human error, the agency institutionalizes simulation-based training applying Bridge Resource Management (BRM) and Bridge Team Management (BTM) frameworks. Furthermore, it enhances the efficacy of maritime accident responses by constructing a multi-layered collaborative network through institutionalized linkages among voluntary rescue organizations, such as Marine Rescue Japan (MRJ) (Yun, 2025: 695-696).
2.3.4 Comprehensive Analysis and Policy Implications
Through a comparative analysis of domestic and international counterpart organizations, the key policy implications derived for enhancing the maritime expertise of the KCG are summarized into the following three dimensions.
First, there is a critical requirement for the extension and institutionalization of the basic training period for newly commissioned officers. While counterpart organizations in major countries cultivate their elite officers through regular higher education curricula spanning at least four years, the KCG relies on a relatively smaller pool of trainees and a short-term training framework. This disparity necessitates a fundamental restructuring of the educational infrastructure to secure robust human resource capabilities.
Second, the systematization of sea-shore rotation and the implementation of a functional career path are urgently required. This entails establishing an administrative personnel mechanism that minimizes assignments-competency mismatches and facilitates the cumulative enrichment of proficiency within specialized functional domains.
Third, the expansion of high-fidelity simulation infrastructures and the institutionalization of regular international combined exercises must be reinforced to elevate immediate response capabilities during maritime crises.
The comprehensive comparison analyzing the key institutional characteristics of these counterpart organizations and their structural gaps with the KCG is systematized in Table 2.
2.4 Trends in Domestic Literature and Distinctiveness of This Study
Discussions on enhancing the professionalism of the Korea Coast Guard (KCG) have continuously accumulated within Korean academia. To examine the specific trends in prior research, this study conducted a search using the Research Information Sharing Service (RISS) and the Korean Citation Index (KCI), employing key terms such as 'Korea Coast Guard,' 'Maritime Expertise,' 'Personnel and Career Management,' 'Education and Training,' and 'Collaborative Governance.' From the approximately 45 literature sources retrieved, 9 key publications directly relevant to the core themes of this study—specifically personnel and career management of key officers, educational systems, operational responsiveness in crisis management, and external governance—were selected for final analysis.
A thematic classification and review of prior research reveals that existing discussions broadly fall into three main domains.
First, studies focusing on education, training, and infrastructure expansion primarily highlighted the short duration of training programs and deficiencies in training facilities. However, they failed to adequately address the structural linkage between completed training and subsequent career management, such as department assignments and promotions.
Second, studies focusing on crisis management and disaster response systems analyzed the causes of command failures in major accidents. Nevertheless, they exhibited limitations in connecting these failures to the fundamental root causes found in the lack of maritime expertise among leadership and key personnel, as well as personnel and career management practices.
Third, comparative studies with foreign counterpart agencies provided analytical benchmarks by introducing the systems of the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) or the United States Coast Guard (USCG). However, they fell short of offering practical alternatives that account for the KCG's unique organizational culture and its practice of short-cycle job rotations.
As presented in Table 3, the common limitations of prior studies can be summarized into two major dimensions.
First, there is a lack of institutional and structural interconnectedness. By addressing the issue of expertise primarily through short-term educational remedies, existing literature failed to induce comprehensive career management reforms from a Strategic Human Resource Management (SHRM) perspective—one that seamlessly connects recruitment, education, assignment, and promotion.
Second, the coupling between internal capabilities and external governance has been largely overlooked. Considering the increasingly complex nature of modern maritime disasters, academic approaches investigating the mechanism through which securing maritime expertise within internal leadership leads to the activation of collaborative governance and external public trust remain insufficient.
Based on the review of prior research, the distinctiveness (Research Gap) and direction of this study are as follows.
To overcome the limitations of previous studies—which predominantly focused on macro-level legal·institutional revisions or fragmentary curriculum improvements—this study adopts an integrated perspective combining SHRM theory and crisis management theory. Rather than relying on single-instance prescriptions, this study identifies the 'structural disconnect in career paths' across recruitment, education, assignment, and promotion as the core underlying cause. Consequently, the analytical focus is placed on examining the linking mechanisms through which this disconnect affects field operational responsiveness and external governance.
Furthermore, through comparative analyses with counterpart international agencies and objective examinations of major accident case studies, this study seeks to explore concrete policy alternatives in terms of human resource and organizational management that can substantially enhance the maritime expertise of the Korea Coast Guard.
3. Diagnosis of the Current Status and Structural Deficits in the KCG's Maritime Expertise
3.1 Assessment of Maritime Expertise Through Major Maritime Disasters
3.1.1 The Sewol Ferry Disaster
The Sewol ferry disaster of 2014 is evaluated as a major catalyst that clearly highlighted the structural limitations of the field response system and the necessity for enhancing operational professionalism during maritime emergencies (BAI, 2014; Joongboo Ilbo, 2014). Structural failures during large-scale maritime disasters stem from complex, multidimensional factors, including confusion in command chains, field uncertainties, deficiencies in communication systems, and equipment constraints. Among these diverse variables, this study focuses specifically on the factor directly linked to the internal personnel and career management of the Korea Coast Guard (KCG)—namely, 'the lack of sea-service experience among command leadership and the resulting information asymmetry'—to diagnose the limitations of operational responsiveness, as detailed below.
First, there were limitations in person-job fit within administrative safety management and navigation control oversight. Reviewing passenger ship navigation regulations and conducting pre-incident safety assessments are domains requiring advanced maritime technical knowledge. However, the academic background, professional licenses, practical experience, and completion of specialized training in maritime fields among administrative personnel assigned to those positions at the time were relatively insufficient (BAI, 2014; KCG, 2018). This deficit in administrative infrastructure expertise led to institutional vulnerabilities that failed to proactively screen potential risk factors.
Second, there were limitations in operational understanding of large vessels among initial response forces and command leadership. Initial rescue units deployed to the scene and the leadership overseeing the operation exhibited constraints in accurately recognizing the structural characteristics and stability mechanisms of car-ferry vessels. In particular, the career disconnect in sea-service and vessel command experience among officers in tactical command exacerbated information asymmetry with field units (such as Patrol Boat 123). This contributed to operational inefficiencies, as command directions remained focused on approaching the bridge area rather than issuing timely evacuation orders toward more accessible exit zones (KCG, 2018).
Third, there were limitations in technical control during high-risk underwater search and rescue operations. In the underwater search process following the vessel's sinking, tactical proficiency limits of public rescue forces in responding to complex tidal currents and weather conditions were exposed. This acted as a constraining factor against the national rescue force exercising decisive technical control in a complex maritime disaster environment (KCG, 2018).
Consequently, the Sewol ferry disaster case demonstrates that career building centered on onshore administration, combined with short-cycle job rotation practices, can lead to information asymmetry and reduced flexibility in command judgment during field operations. This suggests that KCG personnel management policies need to be restructured away from merely producing administrative managers toward cultivating 'maritime experts' equipped with practical sea-service experience and operational field understanding.
3.1.2 The Yeongheungdo Fishing Boat Capsize Disaster
The capsize of the commercial fishing vessel Sunchang No. 1 near Yeongheungdo, Incheon, in December 2017 (resulting in 15 fatalities) represents a key case demonstrating the critical importance of command leadership's operational knowledge and its linkage to career management structures during crisis response. Analysis of the initial response reveals that delays in scene arrival were driven by a complex combination of field-level operational conditions and limitations in command-level situational awareness regarding local sea conditions and equipment deployment mechanisms (KCG, 2018a).
Based on official investigation materials, reconstructing the command response reveals a structural causal chain: Career Disconnect → Deficit in Situational Awareness → Command Limitations → Delayed Arrival at the Scene.
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▸ Structural Career Disconnect: An examination of the career paths of officers in the command and oversight line revealed a pattern of career progression dominated by onshore administrative positions. This led to a disconnect in practical field experience concerning vessel operations, marine domain characteristics (such as tidal currents and water depths), and search and rescue (SAR) asset deployment in actual maritime environments (KCG, 2018a).
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▸ Deficit in Situational Awareness: This disconnect in sea-service experience served as a constraining factor that hindered command leadership from rapidly processing basic maritime spatial information immediately following the incident—such as the narrow channel geography near Yeongheungdo, tidal range dynamics, and optimal response routes (KCG, 2018a).
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▸ Command Limitations: A lack of operational understanding regarding maritime terrain and rescue equipment capabilities led to limitations in tactical command decisions. For instance, commands were issued to dispatch specialized rescue craft with nighttime and mooring constraints from their home port without fully accounting for weather and tidal variables, or deploying assets with restricted nocturnal operational capability as primary response resources (KCG, 2018a).
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▸ Delayed Arrival at the Scene: Consequently, these command decision limitations acted as major contributing factors that hindered rescue forces from arriving at the scene within the critical golden time (KCG, 2018a; Newspim, 2017).
Thus, the Yeongheung-do case demonstrates how job rotation practices skewed toward onshore administration can lead to command-level deficits in maritime spatial awareness during emergencies. This deficit manifests through tactical command limitations, ultimately resulting in delayed field response. Accordingly, this case study provides both academic and practical justification for incorporating practical sea-service and vessel command experience as essential evaluation criteria for command position appointments.
The investigation findings and the causal chain analysis of career management across these major disasters are summarized in Table 4.
3.2 Institutional Framework Deficiencies regarding Maritime Expertise
3.2.1 Ambiguity in the Institutional Concept of Expertise
The dilution of the KCG's maritime expertise stems from institutional deficiencies—specifically, the lack of codified definitions and standardized evaluation criteria for expertise—prior to any micro-level deficits in individual capabilities. Consequently, the overarching Human Resource Management (HRM) framework operates without a robust foundation in rigorous job analysis, exhibiting a structural limitation that remains confined to empirical and conventional paradigms.
Particularly from a Strategic Human Resource Management (SHRM) perspective, contemporary recruitment and promotion examination systems are disproportionately skewed toward land-based policing and legal knowledge, such as Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Act.
This imbalance makes it inherently difficult to secure a sophisticated degree of Person-Job Fit. These institutional constraints manifest a significant disconnect from the perceptions of field personnel. According to survey data from prior literature, as systematized in Table 5, 79% of respondents identified 'maritime expertise' as the most essential competency required for newly commissioned KCG officers, whereas administrative expertise (13%) and legal expertise (6%) received relatively minimal emphasis (Yun, 2024: 309). This empirical indicator underscores the field imperative that "legal and administrative competencies must be constructed upon a foundational understanding of the spatial specificity of the maritime domain," exposing a stark mismatch between institutional job frameworks and actual organizational perceptions.
3.2.2 Limitations in the Officer Development Curriculum
The Korea Coast Guard’s officer development system exhibits notable vulnerabilities in terms of educational duration and curriculum density when compared with the four-year regular higher education infrastructures of counterpart agencies in major nations (such as the Navy, USCG, and JCG). In the case of the Officer Candidate Program (a one-year basic course), practical courses directly linked to vessel operations and rescue duties—such as navigation, marine engineering, and search·diver rescue operations—are structured with fragmented and short-term instructional hours. This serves as a constraining factor in building and accumulating practical tacit knowledge.
Furthermore, special recruitment tracks—including graduates from the Korean National Police University, civil service exam passers, and legal professionals—undergo brief initial training of around three months before early placement into onshore administrative departments at headquarters and regional headquarters within the first one to three years of appointment (Yun, 2024: 305–310). This structural pattern of short-term training and early onshore assignment creates systemic limitations that hinder field-centered officer development essential for high-risk maritime environments.
3.2.3 Trade-offs and Disconnection of Expertise Induced by Short-cycle Rotation Systems
The standard one-year mandatory assignment rule and the short-cycle job rotation practices underlying the current personnel system act as key factors shifting organizational focus toward onshore administration rather than field-centered operations. Newly appointed officers typically rotate into planning departments at headquarters and regional headquarters following minimal field service (KCG, 2024a). While this short-cycle rotation mechanism is structurally justified by the superficial rationale of acquiring diverse job experiences, it poses constraints on mastering complex maritime Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), adapting to variable weather conditions, and building team cohesion.
Consequently, the Coast Guard's job rotation practices induce a structural trade-off between the horizontal expansion of task exposure and the vertical depth of operational mastery, serving as a constraining factor that limits the elevation of maritime expertise across leadership lines.
3.2.4 Track-Assignment Mismatches and the Constraints of 'Shallow Multi-functionality'
Another institutional factor hindering the KCG's field operational responsiveness is the mismatch between functional specialties and actual position assignments. In operational settings, opportunistic position assignments focused primarily on filling immediate personnel quotas occur without fully accounting for technical specializations (such as navigation and engineering). Furthermore, instances have been noted where administrative support personnel were assigned to specialized rescue command positions (BAI, 2023). This practice stands in contrast to advanced counterpart agencies that strictly adhere to specialty-centered career management systems (Yun, 2021: 14–15).
Consequently, the organizational orientation toward cultivating a multi-functional workforce has paradoxically reinforced 'shallow multi-functionality'—a phenomenon where individuals perform diverse tasks superficially without attaining deep expertise. This generalist-centered personnel management serves as a constraining factor that hinders individual job specialization, while contributing to limitations in field operational responsiveness during complex disaster scenarios.
3.3 Limitations in Field Operational Capabilities
3.3.1 Deficit in Leadership's Maritime Expertise
A key vulnerability repeatedly exposed during major maritime disaster responses is the lack of practical field experience among the command line and the resulting limitations in situational judgment. Command leadership with insufficient vessel sea-service experience has faced challenges in resolving Information Asymmetry regarding urgent field conditions during the initial stages of a disaster, thereby contributing to delays during critical golden hours (Joongboo Ilbo, 2014; Hankyoreh, 2024a). Indeed, National Assembly audit data indicated that a considerable portion of decision-making command leadership lacked sufficient experience in patrol vessels and other field assignments (Agriculture, Food, Rural Affairs, Oceans, and Fisheries Committee, 2023).
This deficit in operational experience among command leadership constrains risk perception capabilities necessary to detect abrupt meteorological changes or signs of complex disasters early, while weakening the field execution of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Consequently, the deficit in maritime expertise among command leadership forms a structural mechanism involving information asymmetry, risk perception limitations, and command judgment distortions. This underscores the institutional necessity of mandating sea-service experience as a formal prerequisite for command appointments.
3.3.2 Vulnerabilities in Field Training and Formalistic Operations
The training system intended to secure practical job competencies among Coast Guard personnel faces infrastructure shortages and structural constraints, serving as a factor that hinders qualitative officer development. Although advanced initiatives such as the introduction of Extended Reality (XR)-based simulation platforms are currently underway, nationwide internal training infrastructure remains insufficient, requiring regional headquarters to rely on nearby Naval facilities (Yun, 2024: 309–311; KCG, 2024).
Furthermore, following the dissolution of the Korea Coast Guard Training Corps and the transfer of training functions to regional headquarters, the proportional emphasis on vessel operational training has diminished. In addition, limitations in the expertise of training instructors, coupled with passive acceptance among vessel personnel, have contributed to organizational inertia, where training exercises often remain formalistic procedures.
3.4 Limitations in External Trust and Collaboration
3.4.1 Inactivation of Collaborative Governance
The deficit in maritime expertise within the Korea Coast Guard extends beyond internal organizational issues, creating external limitations where collaborative governance with civilian rescue forces fails to function effectively in practice. Although relevant legal bases exist, insufficient statutory and institutional support leaves continuous governance functions—such as routine joint training, information sharing, and preventive activities—functionally disconnected.
These structural constraints cause the governance framework to lack practical operational viability and continuity, remaining largely as a post-disaster, fragmentary, 'mobilization-based governance' model (Yun, 2025: 695–696). Furthermore, joint public-private training exercises and consultative bodies exhibit limitations regarding stakeholder diversity and resource commitment. This highlights the classic constraints of 'symbolic compliance', where the institutional structure is maintained without generating substantial network value.
3.4.2 Closedness of Crisis Communication and Trust Stagnation Mechanisms
The decline in public trust in the Korea Coast Guard is closely linked to concerns regarding field crisis response capabilities. According to major media reports, the agency is evaluated as having relatively low public perception regarding the transparency of information disclosure and the promptness of response during crisis situations (Hankook Ilbo, 2023; Kyunghyang Shinmun, 2024). The incomplete resolution of negative perceptions accumulated since major disasters is largely attributed to institutional flaws in the crisis communication structure, which requires real-time, two-way responses (Hankyoreh, 2024b).
Due to a lack of procedural consistency in field-centered information disclosure and press briefings during disasters, a cycle persists wherein information asymmetry between the agency and local communities is deepened and trust recovery is delayed (Yun, 2025: 704). Consequently, the issue of maritime expertise within the Coast Guard converges into a multidimensional structural crisis characterized by the formalization of external cooperation and the stagnation of public legitimacy. Addressing these limitations moves beyond a conventional listing of macro-level policies, underscoring the urgency of a personnel administration paradigm shift that redesigns the life-cycle officer development paradigm and practical career paths.
4. Strategic Directions for Enhancing the Maritime Expertise of the KCG
Based on the structural limitations and root causes identified in Chapter 3, this chapter seeks to present tailored policy alternatives that incorporate insights derived from international counterpart agencies, such as the USCG and the JCG. The policy alternatives proposed in this study are structured around three major pillars (Reinforcing institutional foundations, Enhancing field operational responsiveness, Activating collaborative governance).
4.1 Strengthening Institutional Foundations for Officer Development and Career Management
4.1.1 Institutionalizing Competency Standards Linked to Officer Specialties
To translate codified statutory provisions into practical maritime expertise, it is necessary to establish an official framework through tailored competency modeling for key officers. Specifically, this involves constructing a comprehensive Competency Dictionary that reflects the unique job characteristics and maritime response capabilities of functional specialties—such as navigation, engineering, and administration—within the core leadership pipeline.
Furthermore, strong Institutional Alignment must be secured to directly link this assessment system to strategic job assignments, promotion reviews, and performance evaluations, thereby enforcing a continuous and specialized career path rather than remaining a fragmentary training initiative. Institutionalizing mandatory sea-service duration and maritime operational command records as an essential 'Filtering Gate' for promotion to senior command positions (such as Senior Superintendent and above) serves as an effective mechanism to establish field-centered maritime expertise as an absolute criterion for administrative legitimacy.
4.1.2 Paradigm Shift Toward Tailored Officer Development Systems
The current short-term training process (ranging from 3 months to 1 year) acts as a primary constraint that hinders the development of expertise required in high-risk maritime environments. Therefore, to ensure the systematic development of core officers (particularly the Officer Candidate), expanding the initial officer training program requires a strategic two-track approach considering personnel supply gaps and budgetary constraints: a short-term measure adding 6 months of field practical training to the current 1-year basic program, and a mid-to-long-term measure utilizing the Korea Coast Guard Academy as an accredited evaluation institution under legislative amendments to operate as a quasi-degree-granting maritime academy (Yun, 2024: 311–313).
This institutional transition provides a solid foundation for cultivating key officers equipped with operational responsiveness by significantly increasing the proportion of specialized maritime subjects—such as navigation, engineering, and Search and Rescue (SAR)—while reinforcing high-fidelity simulation-based practical training. Transitioning toward this maritime-centered human capital paradigm serves as an institutional mechanism to structurally address internal expertise deficits, while functioning as a strategic framework to enhance independent maritime sovereignty capabilities aligned with global standards (Yun, 2024: 312–313).
4.1.3 Establishing Scientific Personnel and Assignment Systems Based on Maritime Expertise
To resolve mismatches between functional specialties and actual position assignments while maximizing human resource efficiency, introducing a data-driven job assignment model that integrates academic backgrounds, professional licenses, and practical sea-service evaluation indicators represents an effective measure. Concurrently, measures must be implemented for new key officers to expand recruitment quotas for patrol vessel personnel from maritime and fisheries educational backgrounds at the initial hiring stage, alongside constructing a multidimensional interview framework that prioritizes maritime job competency verification.
Through these structural improvements, overall personnel policy should transition from the conventional generalist-centered paradigm toward a structure centered on Functional Career Paths specialized for unique maritime missions.
4.2 Enhancing Field Operational Responsiveness
4.2.1 Elevating Maritime Expertise and Capabilities of Command Leadership
To mitigate structural response failures observed in past major maritime disasters, it is essential to address career management disconnects among key officers and secure practical sea-service experience within the command line.
To this end, intensive maritime-centered Human Resource Development (HRD) programs should be deployed from the early career stages of newly commissioned officers, accompanied by official regulations governing sea-land job rotations. Based on the evaluation criteria established in the Competency Dictionary, institutionalizing mandatory sea-service and vessel command experience as essential requirements for promotion to senior command positions (Senior Superintendent and above) serves as an effective policy mechanism.
4.2.2 Operationalizing Education and Training Systems
To overcome formalistic tendencies in conventional training paradigms, a structural shift toward institutionalizing simulation-based Tabletop Exercises (TTX) and field training exercises is required. In particular, for advanced C4ISR command-and-control systems to effectively generate operational responsiveness, they must be coupled with the maritime spatial awareness of operating personnel and command leadership. Even when sophisticated C4ISR systems stream real-time satellite imagery and hydrographic data, advanced information remains mere static data if the commander's field operational understanding is deficient.
Furthermore, regarding training system reform, a comprehensive performance management system should be established—replacing nominal quantitative and qualitative metrics with quantifiable operational indicators, such as emergency response time, equipment operation rates, rescue success rates, and the database accumulation of After Action Reviews (AAR). These performance metrics must be directly linked to organizational performance and commander personnel evaluations to secure administrative accountability. Concurrently, to elevate training quality, introducing a Certified Specialist Instructor System that matches sea-service experience with instructional competence is urgently needed. This should be supplemented by establishing interdisciplinary educational networks with the Navy and civilian experts, thereby addressing the limitations of theory-centered education and fostering an operationally responsive training ecosystem for the core officer leadership pipeline.
4.2.3 Advancing Field-Centered Personnel Management and Command Systems
To maximize initial response capabilities during maritime disasters, it is necessary to systematically adjust the conventional short-cycle job rotation framework and achieve strategic advancements toward a field-centered integrated command structure.
First, to prevent career disconnects among key officers, official Functional Career Paths that manage specialized maritime personnel within a long-term and continuous horizon must be embedded within personnel regulations.
Second, an integrated command architecture based on the C4ISR network must be reinforced, centered on the comprehensive situation center. By establishing real-time synchronization among the main headquarters, regional headquarters, and field operational units (vessels and police stations), the situation center should be redefined as an active hub for crisis response and operational command rather than a passive administrative reporting entity.
Third, practical sea-service operation records must be institutionalized as an essential competency criterion for appointments to core command positions.
When this multidimensional structure is established, the personnel administration of the Korea Coast Guard will transition from the conventional generalist-centered paradigm toward a competency-based organization that substantially secures field operational responsiveness.
4.3 Activating Collaborative Governance and Enhancing Public Trust
4.3.1 Establishing a Trust-Based, Continuous, and Participatory Governance Architecture
To effectively activate public-private cooperation and restore public trust in the Korea Coast Guard, a paradigm shift is required—transitioning from post-accident, fragmentary mobilization models toward a continuous and institutionalized collaborative governance architecture.
First, to maximize the capabilities of civilian rescue forces and network synergy, the Korea Maritime Rescue and Salvage Association (KMRA) and the Marine Disaster Rescue Corps should be integrated. Furthermore, by benchmarking the USCG Auxiliary system, explicit statutory provisions for financial support and legal incentive structures must be established to institutionalize continuous participation incentives for civilian rescue actors.
Second, to overcome formalistic tendencies in joint public-private exercises, quarterly Tabletop Exercises (TTX) and semi-annual Field Training Exercises (FX) should be normalized. These exercises must be directly linked to comprehensive evaluation mechanisms that guarantee stakeholder diversity and operational realism in asset mobilization.
4.3.2 Expanding Organizational Receptivity and the Virtuous Cycle Mechanism of 'Institutionalization–Operationalization–Securing Reliability’
Third, for collaborative governance to function effectively, a comprehensive enhancement of Organizational Receptivity is required to mitigate bureaucratic and closed organizational cultures within the Korea Coast Guard. This institutional transition must guide internal members to perceive civilian participants not as mere auxiliary forces, but as equal partners sharing operational autonomy and mutual accountability.
Fourth, to address the closed crisis communication and structural distrust exhibited in past response failures, the Korea Coast Guard should institutionalize open and transparent information disclosure protocols during maritime disasters. Minimizing information asymmetry between the agency and local communities through real-time, two-way communication channels serves as a prerequisite for converting institutional structures into actionable Social Capital and securing public trust.
Ultimately, the strategic policy alternatives proposed in this study are not a mere fragmentary listing of policy tasks; rather, they are systematically grounded within an organic framework of 'Institutionalization → Operationalization → Securing Reliability' driven through comprehensive reforms in Officer Development and Career Management. Solid human resource management and legislative foundations established through advanced competency modeling—representing Institutionalization—act as the primary driver for Operationalization, which enhances operational capabilities and reinforces command lines. When the practical proficiency accumulated through this process converges into Securing Reliability via activated collaborative governance and external legitimacy, a sustainable maritime safety system can finally be established. As this multidimensional virtuous mechanism becomes institutionalized, the Korea Coast Guard will transition beyond the limitations of a conventional monopoly enforcement agency into an elite, specialized maritime organization possessing strong public value and institutional legitimacy.
4.4 Academic Discussion
The empirical and qualitative findings derived from this study provide three major academic implications for Strategic Human Resource Management (SHRM) in the public sector, as well as crisis management and governance theoretical frameworks:
First, identifying the 'Contextual Fit' of SHRM and the dysfunctional effects of job rotations. Traditional public SHRM literature (e.g., Bryson, 2018) has evaluated job rotations as a key mechanism to secure employee multi-functionality and break down departmental silos. However, this study demonstrates that when short-cycle job rotations persist within an extreme, high-risk maritime environment, they paradoxically yield only 'shallow multi-functionality' while eroding the depth of expertise. This indicates that, unlike general administrative organizations, maritime law enforcement agencies—which demand advanced real-time judgment—require SHRM to be established differentially to align with occupational specificity (contextual fit). Theoretically, it highlights the necessity of designing specialized career development paths—namely, Functional Career Paths—capable of managing the trade-off between rotation practices and specialization.
Second, uncovering the structural drivers of 'mobilization-based governance' through integration with collaborative governance theory. The collaborative governance model advanced by Ansell and Gash (2008) emphasizes external trust building, leadership, and institutional alignment as critical success factors. This study reveals that the success or failure of such governance is heavily contingent not only on external collaborative structures, but also on the internal leadership's maritime expertise. The lack of sea-service and field command experience among senior commanders generates information asymmetry with civilian rescue forces and counterpart agencies. This acts as a mechanism that regresses continuous, organic partnerships into fragmentary, 'mobilization-based governance' during emergencies.
Third, theorizing the interaction between technological systems (C4ISR) and human assets. While existing crisis management studies have predominantly focused on the technical advancement of high-tech information and communication infrastructure such as C4ISR, this study presents the integration of 'operators' maritime spatial situational awareness' as a prerequisite for technological systems to effectively generate field operational responsiveness. This suggests that advanced crisis management technology reaches operational completion only when organically coupled with a commander's tacit knowledge and empirical expertise.
5. Conclusion
This study was conducted to diagnose the multidimensional institutional and structural factors that hinder the securing of maritime expertise in the Korea Coast Guard (KCG)—which performs national maritime policing and disaster management duties—and to explore strategic directions for substantial capability enhancement. The analysis reveals that the limitations in practical expertise among KCG personnel stem not merely from microscopic individual competency deficits, but from structural factors resulting from the interplay of insufficient task-centered institutional foundations, deficiencies in field response infrastructure and command systems, and the formalization of external collaborative governance.
To overcome these structural limitations, this study presents three strategic directions for enhancing the maritime expertise of the KCG, anchored in an organic framework of 'Institutionalization – Operationalization – Securing Reliability':
First, at the [Institutionalization] level, this study proposes formalizing the concept of expertise by constructing a Competency Dictionary, enhancing maritime expertise through a phased academic structure reform, and establishing Functional Career Paths based on professional licenses and academic majors.
Second, at the [Operationalization] level, this study emphasizes elevating spatial situational awareness by institutionalizing mandatory sea-service and vessel command requirements for leadership appointments and promotions, operationalizing education and training through quantitative performance management systems, and advancing integrated command systems by coupling the C4ISR network with commanders' operational understanding of sea areas.
Third, at the [Securing Reliability] level, this study derives measures to settle continuous participation structures through the functional integration of civilian rescue forces and unified governance legislation, alongside securing public trust by sharing field-centered public values.
This study holds significant academic and practical implications by expanding the analytical domain through applying public sector Strategic Human Resource Management (SHRM) and crisis management discourses to the specialized maritime policing domain, while multidimensionally establishing actionable policy directions centered on Officer Development and Career Management reforms.
However, as an exploratory study focused on presenting a macro-level institutional design and an integrated analytical framework, this study carries inherent limitations. Consequently, future research should continue to focus on developing policy evaluation models to empirically verify the effectiveness of the policy alternatives proposed herein, as well as constructing specific indicators to measure the maturity of collaborative governance in maritime safety systems.







